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Abstract
Imprudent underwriting and mortgage origination in the years leading up to the Global Fi-
nancial Crisis of 2007 and 2008 was determined to be one of its predominant causes. As a result,
partly in an effort to protect consumers and ensure that lending institutions did not relapse into
poor mortgage origination practices, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act. This Note examines the qualified mortgage rule promulgated by the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act. This rule is intended to
ensure that borrowers receive loans that are not unfair, deceptive, or abusive, and to ensure that
lenders will be repaid by borrowers. However, despite public belief that the rule will afford protec-
tion to all borrowers, the rule may unintentionally have a negative impact on Black and Hispanic
borrowers by increasing lending costs for a greater percentage of
minority borrowers.
This Note argues that there are strong justifications for modifying the qualified mortgage rule’s
requirement that a borrower have a 43% debt-to-income ratio. This Note will examine criticism of
the rule as well as statistical data of historical mortgage originations to determine that the rule may
negatively impact minority borrowers. The rule will force a larger percentage of Black and His-
panic borrowers to pay exorbitant prices for government guaranteed loans compared to similarly
situated Asian and White borrowers. Black and Hispanic borrowers are, on average, more unlikely
to meet the qualified mortgage rule’s 43% debt-to-income requirement. This Note presents multi-
ple solutions to this problem in the form of proposed amendments to the qualified mortgage rule.
∗J.D. Candidate Fordham University School of Law, 2016; B.A., Politics and French, New York
University, 2011. The author would like to thank Professor Susan Block-Lieb for her invaluable
wisdom and guidance throughout the development of this Note. Any errors are my own. The
author would also like to thank his parents, Tom and Gayle, and sister, Lauren, for their love and
unwavering support.
All of these proposals will ensure that borrowers receive loans they are capable of repaying, while
simultaneously removing the projected disparate impact upon Black and Hispanic borrowers.
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ABSTRACT 
Imprudent underwriting and mortgage origination in the years 
leading up to the Global Financial Crisis of 2007 and 2008 was 
determined to be one of its predominant causes. As a result, partly in 
an effort to protect consumers and ensure that lending institutions 
did not relapse into poor mortgage origination practices, Congress 
passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act. This Note examines the qualified mortgage rule 
promulgated by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau pursuant 
to the Dodd-Frank Act. This rule is intended to ensure that borrowers 
receive loans that are not unfair, deceptive, or abusive, and to ensure 
that lenders will be repaid by borrowers. However, despite public 
belief that the rule will afford protection to all borrowers, the rule 
may unintentionally have a negative impact on Black and Hispanic 
borrowers by increasing lending costs for a greater percentage of 
minority borrowers. 
This Note argues that there are strong justifications for modifying 
the qualified mortgage rule’s requirement that a borrower have a 
43% debt-to-income ratio. This Note will examine criticism of the 
rule as well as statistical data of historical mortgage originations to 
determine that the rule may negatively impact minority borrowers. 
The rule will force a larger percentage of Black and Hispanic 
borrowers to pay exorbitant prices for government guaranteed loans 
compared to similarly situated Asian and White borrowers. Black 
and Hispanic borrowers are, on average, more unlikely to meet the 
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qualified mortgage rule’s 43% debt-to-income requirement. This 
Note presents multiple solutions to this problem in the form of 
proposed amendments to the qualified mortgage rule. All of these 
proposals will ensure that borrowers receive loans they are capable 
of repaying, while simultaneously removing the projected disparate 
impact upon Black and Hispanic borrowers. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Title XIV of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (the “Dodd-Frank Act”), the Mortgage Reform and Anti-
Predatory Lending Act, was intended to address irresponsible lending 
practices that occurred prior to the financial crisis, notably those relating 
to subprime mortgages.1 Title XIV amends the Truth in Lending Act to 
require that consumers receive residential mortgage loans on terms that 
reasonably reflect their ability to repay and to receive a loan that is not 
“unfair, deceptive, or abusive.” 2  In implementing Title XIV, the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (the “CFPB”) promulgated a 
definition of “qualified mortgage” that was intended to ensure that 
“residential borrowers only take loans that are suitable for them.” 3 
Clearly, the qualified mortgage rule was created to aid consumers.4 
However, the final qualified mortgage rule has received backlash from 
consumer advocacy groups and industry constituents who argue that the 
rule will handicap consumers by unnecessarily limiting mortgage 
options and access to credit.5  
																																																																																																																																
 1. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, § 1402, 124 Stat. 1376, 2138-39 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 
1639a-1639b (2012)). 
 2. Id. 
 3. See Jay Weiser, Dodd-Frank Qualified Mortgage Rules Will Create a New 
Bubble, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Jan. 16, 2013, 10:45 AM), http://www.usnews.com 
/opinion/blogs/economic-intelligence/2013/01/16/dodd-frank-qualified-mortgage-rules-
will-create-a-new-bubble [http://perma.cc/UME2-VBCP]. 
 4. Ctr. for Responsible Lending et al., Comment Letter on Proposed Rule to 
Implement the Ability to Repay/Qualified Mortgage Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and consumer Protection Act of 2010, at 1 (July 9, 2012), 
http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/policy-legislation/regulators/QM-
Comment-Letter_Final_0709.pdf [http://perma.cc/N7CS-JEUU]. 
 5. See id. at 5 (concluding that “a lower [debt-to-income] will also 
disproportionately exclude low and moderate income borrowers as well as communities 
of color.”); see also Ctr. For Responsible Lending et al., Discussion Draft on Ability-to-
Repay (“ATR”) and Qualified Mortgage (“QM”) Determination, at 1 (Mar. 7, 2012), 
http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/QM_Term_Sheet_3-7-12.pdf [http://perma.cc/M9CN 
-UE27] (stating that “[i]f the QM [qualified mortgage] definition is construed narrowly, 
it will be more difficult for low-income and minority families to qualify for safer 
loans”); Greenlining Inst., Comment Letter on Proposed Rule to Implement the Ability 
to Repay/Qualified Mortgage Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
consumer Protection Act of 2010, at 1 (July 9, 2012) (stating that “Greenlining is 
keenly aware of the potential negative impact the implementation of the proposed QRM 
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Part I of this Note provides background information on the 
financial crisis, the qualified mortgage rule, and lending alternatives to 
qualified mortgages. Part II examines the criticisms against the qualified 
mortgage rule, including an analysis of the anticipated disparate impact 
that some minority borrowers may face as a result of the rule, and a 
tension between the rule and the Fair Housing Act. Part III presents 
alternatives to the qualified mortgage rule that provide equal access to 
credit for creditworthy minority consumers. This Note concludes that 
the inflexible debt-to-income requirements and loan parameters of the 
qualified mortgage rule increase the likelihood that less affluent 
borrowers, and consequently more minority borrowers, 6  will not be 
eligible for a qualified mortgage when Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are 
removed from conservatorship. 
																																																																																																																																
[qualified residential mortgage] rules could have on low-income families and families 
of color”); Cmty. Depository Inst. Advisory Council, Comment Letter on Proposed 
Rule to Implement the Ability to Repay/Qualified Mortgage Provisions of the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and consumer Protection Act of 2010, at 1 (July 9, 2012) 
(stating that “[t]he CFPB’s proposed Qualified Mortgage (QM) Ability to Pay 
regulations, combined with the large number of additional restrictive mortgage lending 
regulations, have caused many community institutions to begin to curtail mortgage 
lending businesses or, alternatively, intentionally price themselves out of the mortgage 
loan market.”); Nat’l Cmty. Reinvestment Coal., Comment Letter on the Decision to 
Release a Final Rule on a Qualified Mortgage Safe Harbor or Rebuttable Presumption 
to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, at 2-3 (Nov. 20, 2012) (stating that 
“[p]ast experience suggests that racial minorities and borrowers from low and 
moderate-income neighborhoods are more likely to receive rebuttable presumption 
loans, both as the result of illegal steering and the unnecessarily restrictive criteria 
included in the compromise waterfall approach to defining qualified mortgages.”). 
 6. Hispanic and Black Americans are, on average, statistically less affluent than 
their Asian and White counterparts. In 2014, the real median household income by race 
was as follows: Asian: $74,297; White: $60,256; Hispanic: $42,491; Black: $35,398. 
See CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT & BERNADETTE D. PROCTOR, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
INCOME AND POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 2014, at 7 (2015), http://www.census.go 
v/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2015/demo/p60-252.pdf [http://perma.cc/36 
C8-DLU8]. Additionally, the median net worth of households by race in 2013 was as 
follows: White: $141,900; Hispanic: $13,700; Black: $11,000. See Rakesh Kochhar & 
Richard Fry, Wealth Inequality has Widened Along Racial, Ethnic Lines Since End of 
Great Recession, PEW RES. CTR. (Dec. 12, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2014/12/12/racial-wealth-gaps-great-recession/ [http://perma.cc/2SDB-6UFM]. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
A. THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 
One of the pivotal causes of the global financial crisis and the 
underlying United States subprime mortgage crisis was the implosion of 
home value that began in 2007.7 Prior to this collapse, housing prices 
had experienced an extraordinary rise in value in the United States, with 
prices nationwide peaking in the second quarter of 2006.8 Between early 
2002 and mid-2006, the average price of a home increased 71%. 9 
Because the value of American homes increased “more sharply and 
dramatically than the change in value of other assets,”10 the rise in home 
values was characterized as a bubble.11 In fact, real estate prices grew 
faster than the increase in family income.12 
Housing prices increased rapidly during this period for multiple 
reasons.13 First, the Federal Reserve “injected additional reserves” into 
the monetary supply, 14  which caused interest rates to reach “near-
historic lows” from 2002 to 2004, and made credit inexpensive and 
more accessible.15 Second, “irrational exuberance” caused a “heightened 
																																																																																																																																
 7. Dean Baker, The Housing Bubble and the Financial Crisis, 46 REAL-WORLD 
ECO. REV. 73 (2008), http://www.paecon.net/PAEReview/issue46/Baker46.pdf [http://p 
erma.cc/7SLA-FPMY]. 
 8. STAN J. LIEBOWITZ, Anatomy of a Train Wreck: Causes of the Mortgage 
Meltdown, in HOUSING AMERICA: BUILDING OUT OF A CRISIS 287 (Randall G. 
Holcombe & Benjamin W. Powell eds., 2009). 
 9. N. GREGORY MANKIW & LAURENCE M. BALL, MACROECONOMICS AND THE 
FINANCIAL SYSTEM 389 (2011). 
 10. RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL ET AL., THE LAW OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 30 (5th 
ed. 2013). 
 11. Jeff Holt, A Summary of the Primary Causes of the Housing Bubble and the 
Resulting Credit Crisis: A Non-Technical Paper, 8 J. BUS. INQUIRY 120, 120-29 (2009), 
http://www.uvu.edu/woodbury/docs/summaryoftheprimarycauseofthehousingbubble.pd
f [http://perma.cc/RY89-7PZR]. 
 12. NAR Study: Majority of Metro Areas Experiencing Widening Inequality, NAT’L 
ASS’N OF REALTORS (May 7, 2015), http://www.realtor.org/news-releases/2015/05/nar-
study-majority-of-metro-areas-experiencing-widening-inequality [http://perma.cc/YV9 
B-258J]. 
 13. See infra notes 14-25 and accompanying text. 
 14. JAMES GWARTNEY ET AL., SPECIAL TOPIC: CRASH OF 2008 10-11 (2011), 
http://commonsenseeconomics.com/wp-content/uploads/CrashOf2008_Aug10.pdf [http 
://perma.cc/V6ZZ-MSQH]. 
 15. CARNELL ET AL., supra note 10, at 31. 
418 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XXI 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
state of speculative fervor” that home prices would continue to rise.16 
The belief that home values would continue to increase was attributed to 
a variety of factors: (1) stable or increasing home values nationwide in 
any single year since the Great Depression,17 (2) anticipated increased 
demand in housing from the baby boom generation,18 (3) absence of 
“severe overbuilding,”19 and (4) healthy employment levels.20 Confident 
that housing prices would continue to increase, lenders began to use the 
market value of homes as a proxy for security.21 Irrational exuberance 
resulted in banks willingly loaning larger amounts against homes 
because the homes served as collateral for the loan.22 Lenders presumed 
that even if a borrower were to become unable to repay their loan, a loss 
could be avoided by either having the borrower refinance the house for a 
larger loan based upon the appreciation in the value of the home from 
the time of the borrower’s initial purchase,23 or foreclose on and resell 
the home in order to recoup the funds loaned to the borrower.24 Thus, a 
cyclical “feedback effect” was created, where “[l]ow interest rates 
allowed people to borrow more, bidding up home prices,” and causing 
home prices to soar.25 
																																																																																																																																
 16. Holt, supra note 11, at 125. 
 17. Housing Bubble -- or Bunk?, BLOOMBERG BUS. (June 21, 2005), http://www.bl 
oomberg.com/bw/stories/2005-06-21/housing-bubble-or-bunk [http://perma.cc/4RNP-2 
FHA]. 
 18. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., THE STATE OF THE 
NATION’S HOUSING 3 (2006), http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/jchs.harvard.edu/files/s 
on2006_bw.pdf [http://perma.cc/5Y7F-CVJ6]. 
 19. Id. at 2. 
 20. Id. 
 21. CARNELL ET AL., supra note 10, at 31. 
 22. Id. 
 23. See U.N.C. DEP’T OF STATISTICS & OPERATIONS RESEARCH, SUBPRIME 
MORTGAGE CRISIS 6 (2008), http://www.stat.unc.edu/faculty/cji/fys/2012/Subprime%20 
mortgage%20crisis.pdf [http://perma.cc/4M8N-2LAQ]; see also CARNELL ET AL., supra 
note 10, at 31. 
 24. See Les Christie, You Lost Your House - But You Still Have to Pay, CNN 
MONEY (Feb. 3, 2010, 3:21 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2010/02/03/real_estate/foreclos 
ure_deficiency_judgement/ [https//perma.cc/6J78-UKH8]. 
 25. See Adam J. Levitin et al., Securitization: Cause or Remedy of the Financial 
Crisis? 9 (Georgetown Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 1462895; Univ. of Pa., Inst. 
for Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 09-31, 2009), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=1462895 [http://perma.cc/WUS2-W6J4]. 
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Moreover, residential mortgage origination “began to grossly 
deviate from prudent underwriting guidelines.” 26  Traditionally, 
mortgages have been originated with (1) “risk-based pricing,” 27  (2) 
“fixed-rate interest rates that were significantly higher than the then 
prevailing market levels or adjustable rate mortgages with comfortable 
margins over the index,” 28  and (3) mortgage insurance when 
“borrowers’ FICO scores were lower or [loan-to-value ratios] were 
higher than the underwriting norms.”29 However, this conservatism was 
noticeably missing from mortgages originated in the mid-2000s and 
leading up to the global financial crisis.30 Low-documentation and no-
documentation mortgages, 31  commonly known as “liar’s loans,” 32 
became prevalent as mortgage originators stopped requiring borrowers 
to provide extensive documentation of their assets and income.33 Some 
originators even went so far as to collude with borrowers to overstate 
these items through the creation of counterfeit W-2 and 1099 forms.34 
Mortgages would routinely ignore the use of risk-based pricing. 35 
Additionally, originators increasingly lowered down payments and, at 
times, required no down payment.36 This created loans with loan-to-
																																																																																																																																
 26. JOSEPH C. HU, ASSET SECURITIZATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 212-13 (2011); 
see also CARNELL ET AL., supra note 10, at 31. 
 27. See HU, supra note 26, at 212. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. See id. at 213; see also CARNELL ET AL., supra note 10, at 31. 
 31. “No-doc” mortgages are a class of loans that permit borrowers to limit the 
income, employment, or asset information on mortgage applications. See KATHLEEN C. 
ENGEL & PATRICIA A MCCOY, THE SUBPRIME VIRUS, RECKLESS CREDIT, REGULATORY 
FAILURE, AND NEXT STEPS 36-37 (2011). 
 32. Liar’s loans refer to a category of low documentation loans, such as stated 
income/stated asset (“SISA”) loans and no income/no asset (“NINA”) loans, where 
lenders and/or borrowers would misrepresent the borrower’s income and/or assets to 
enable the borrower to qualify for a larger mortgage. See id. at 36; see also CARNELL ET 
AL., supra note 10, at 31. 
 33. John C. Coffee, Jr., Ratings Reform: The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly, 1 
HARV. BUS. L. REV. 231, 245 (2011). 
 34. Binyamin Appelbaum, How Mortgage Fraud Made the Financial Crisis 
Worse, N.Y. TIMES, (Feb. 12, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/13/upshot/how-
mortgage-fraud-made-the-financial-crisis-worse.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/ML7F-CW 
QL]. 
 35. See Hu, supra note 26, at 212. 
 36. CARNELL ET AL., supra note 10, at 31. 
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value ratios that exceeded the prudent level of 80%.37 Loans with loan-
to-value ratios exceeding 80% traditionally required private loan 
insurance; however, originators suspended this practice during this 
time. 38  Furthermore, originators manipulated maturity terms, 
amortization schedules, and teaser rates in adjustable rate mortgages in 
order to get mortgages approved, even when originators knew that 
borrowers lacked sufficient income to service the mortgage over the life 
of the loan.39 
Deviation from prudent underwriting guidelines resulted in the 
creation of the “originate-to-distribute” model of mortgage lending, in 
which mortgage originators quickly sell loans, often through a 
securitization transaction.40 Originators, armed with the knowledge that 
they were immune from the risks of borrower default because originated 
loans were to be sold quickly, slacked in performing due diligence 
before loaning to borrowers with poor credit. 41  As a result of the 
originate-to-distribute model, subprime mortgages, accounting for only 
9% of the mortgage market in the 1990s, more than doubled to account 
for 20% of the mortgage market by 2006.42 
Securities backed by residential mortgages tie the success of the 
financial markets to homes values.43 In the lead up to the crisis, the 
financial world became increasingly exposed to the risk of these 
																																																																																																																																
 37. See HU, supra note 26, at 212-13. The loan-to-value ratio is “the ratio . . . 
between the amount of a mortgage loan and the value of the property pledged as 
security for the mortgage.” Loan-to-Value Ratio, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 
2014). 
 38. HU, supra note 26, at 213. 
 39. See Tami Luhby, Predatory-Lending Lawsuits on the Rise, CNN MONEY (Oct. 
9, 2009, 7:19 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2009/10/08/news/economy/Predatory_lendin 
g_lawsuits_increase [http://perma.cc/HM8F-WH82]; see also Dennis Hevesi, New 
Curbs on Predatory Loans, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002 
/11/10/realestate/new-curbs-on-predatory-loans.html [http://perma.cc/MDS9-GXGU]. 
 40. CARNELL ET AL., supra note 10, at 31. For a more in-depth discussion of the 
originate-to-distribute model and its widespread effects, see Amiyatosh K. 
Purnanandam, Originate-to-Distribute Model and the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 24 
REV. FIN. STUD. 1881 (2011). 
 41. See Benjamin J. Keys et al., Did Securitization Lead to Lax Screening? 
Evidence from Subprime Loans, 125 Q. J. ECON. 307, 354 (2010). 
 42. Chris Arnold, Economists Brace for Worsening Subprime Crisis, NPR (Aug. 7, 
2007, 12:42 PM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=12561184 
[http://perma.cc/ZC23-UMVB]. 
 43. CARNELL ET AL., supra note 10, at 31. 
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residential mortgage-backed securities. 44  This risk exposure was 
exacerbated by the prevalence of residential mortgage-backed securities 
that included subprime mortgages in the packaged pool of assets. 45 Due 
to the rise in popularity of residential mortgage-backed securities, the 
financial world was not exposed to a general risk of loan defaults, but 
rather to the increased risk caused by suspect lending practices during 
this period.46 For example, declining home values caused borrowers to 
refinance their homes to obtain more money. 47  Simultaneously, 
adjustable rate mortgages that were originated at low teaser rates would 
increase to higher rates that many homeowners could not afford.48 
Declining home values, borrowers’ inability to refinance, and the 
increase of interest rates in adjustable rate mortgages triggered a 
massive foreclosure crisis.49 Between January 2007 and the end of 2009, 
an estimated 2.5 million foreclosures occurred. 50  In addition, it is 
projected that nearly 13 million homes will go through foreclosure 
before the effects of the crisis fully dissipate.51 Foreclosed homes tend to 
																																																																																																																																
 44. See id. at 31-32. 
 45. Subprime loans are originated to borrowers who are not eligible to qualify for 
conventional mortgages due to poor credit scores. Subsequently, these borrowers 
receive higher interest rates to correspond with the heightened risk the borrowers create 
for lenders. See ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 31, at 21, 25-32. 
 46. See CARNELL ET AL., supra note 10, at 31. 
 47. Katalina M. Bianco, The Subprime Lending Crisis: Causes and Effects of the 
Mortgage Meltdown 9-10 (2008), http://business.cch.com/images/banner/subprime.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/WF6P-HVC7]. 
 48. See ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 31, at 29 (noting that as subprime lending 
became mainstream, “[b]ait-and-switch tactics persisted, with lenders surprising 
borrowers at loan closings with . . . new interest rates [that] were adjustable and could 
double or triple over time.”). 
 49. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., OFFICE OF POLICY DEV. & 
RESEARCH, REPORT. TO CONGRESS ON THE ROOT CAUSES OF THE FORECLOSURE CRISIS 
(2010), www.huduser.org/portal/publications/foreclosure_09.pdf [http://perma.cc/9LEK 
-ZS27]. 
 50. DEBBIE GRUENSTEIN BOCIAN ET AL., CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, 
FORECLOSURES BY RACE AND ETHNICITY: THE DEMOGRAPHICS OF A CRISIS 2 (2010), 
http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/research-analysis/foreclosures-by 
-race-and-ethnicity.pdf [https://perma.cc/9PJV-HYV6]. 
 51. JAN HATZIUS & MICHAEL A. MARSCHOUN, GOLDMAN SACHS GLOB. ECON. 
RESEARCH, HOME PRICES AND CREDIT LOSSES: PROJECTIONS AND POLICY OPTIONS 16 
(2009) (projecting 13 million foreclosures by 2014). 
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lack proper maintenance52 and are sold at discounted prices, which tend 
to erode the value of nearby homes.53 This is because foreclosure sales 
are considered to be comparable sales when appraisers determine the 
value of homes in a neighborhood, even though foreclosed properties 
are sold for only a fraction of their original loan value.54 Studies have 
found that foreclosures lower the price of nearby homes by at least 1%.55 
To make matters worse, empty homes are ravaged for copper plumbing 
and aluminum siding, and can also attract criminal drug activity.56 Thus, 
foreclosed properties impair the value of neighboring properties, and 
harm neighboring homeowners who wish to sell or refinance their 
homes. 57  The effects of foreclosures are widespread, leading to 
“negative cycles of disinvestment” and the “decline [of] entire 
communities.”58 
In response to the subprime mortgage crisis, the federal government 
found it necessary to place Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 59  into 
																																																																																																																																
 52. See generally Irwin M. Stelzer, Why They Call It the Dismal Science: 
Everything You Need To Know About the Mortgage Crisis in Three Economics 
Buzzwords, WKLY. STANDARD, Nov. 26, 2007 (discussing externalities caused by the 
mortgage crisis). 
 53. See CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, 2013 UPDATE: THE SPILLOVER EFFECTS 
OF FORECLOSURES (2013), http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/researc 
h-analysis/2013-crl-research-update-foreclosure-spillover-effects-final-aug-19-docx.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/FT76-UUJF]. 
 54. APPRAISAL INST., GUIDE NOTE 11: COMPARABLE SELECTION IN A DECLINING 
MARKET 3, http://www.appraisalinstitute.org/assets/1/7/guide-note-11.pdf [http://perma 
.cc/MJQ8-WSEH] (“Appraisers cannot categorically discount foreclosures and short 
sales as potential comps in the sales comparison approach.”). 
 55. Id.; see also Les Christie, The Ugly Face of Foreclosure, CNN MONEY (May 7, 
2007, 6:54 PM) http://money.cnn.com/2007/05/02/real_estate/face_of_foreclosure/ [htt 
p://perma.cc/ZW2B-B9AA]. 
 56. See Christie, supra note 55. 
 57. See Calculated Risk Assessing Non-Traditional Mortgage Products: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Housing & Transportation and the Subcomm. on Economic 
Policy of the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. (2006) 
(statement of William A. Simpson, Vice President, Mortgage Insurance Companies of 
America); see also Ian Urbina, Foreclosures Prompt Cities to Make Plea for Aid, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 24, 2008), nytimes.com/2008/01/24/us/24mayors.html [http://perma.cc/NZ 
G9-EJ76]. 
 58. See John C. Dugan, Comptroller of the Currency, Remarks Before the National 
Foundation for Credit Counseling (April 4, 2007), http://www.occ.treas.gov/news-
issuances/speeches/2007/pub-speech-2007-44.pdf [http://perma.cc/SHU5-K95E]. 
 59. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are government-sponsored entities created to 
provide liquidity to the nation’s mortgage finance system by issuing mortgage-backed 
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conservatorship in September 2008.60 In elaborating on the decision to 
place Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into conservatorship, Treasury 
Secretary Henry Paulson opined that allowing them to fail “would affect 
the ability of Americans to get home loans . . . and other consumer 
credit and . . . would be harmful to economic growth and job creation.”61 
B. ADDRESSING THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 
Congress sought to address the subprime mortgage crisis by 
including key sections in the Dodd-Frank Act to target these issues.62 
Title XIV of the Dodd-Frank Act, the Mortgage Reform and Anti-
Predatory Lending Act, was intended to address irresponsible lending 
practices that occurred prior to the financial crisis, notably those relating 
to subprime mortgages.63 Title XIV amends the Truth in Lending Act to 
require that consumers receive residential mortgage loans on terms that 
“reasonably reflect their ability to repay the loans on terms that are 
understandable and not unfair, deceptive or abusive.”64 
1. Ability-to-Repay Rule 
Pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act, “no creditor may make a 
residential mortgage loan unless the creditor makes a reasonable and 
good faith determination based on verified and documented information 
																																																																																																																																
securities. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac lost a combined $265 billion between January 
2008 and March 2012 as a result of the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis. See John 
Griffith, 7 Things You Need to Know About Fannie May and Freddie Mac, CTR. FOR 
AMERICAN PROGRESS (Sept. 6, 2012), http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/housing/ 
report/2012/09/06/36736/7-things-you-need-to-know-about-fannie-mae-and-freddie-ma 
c/ [http://perma.cc/B4YQ-AKBK]. 
 60. FHFA as Conservator of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, FED. HOUS. FIN. 
AGENCY, http://www.fhfa.gov/Conservatorship/pages/history-of-fannie-mae—freddie-c 
onservatorships.aspx [http://perma.cc/7BG4-7R33]. 
 61. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Statement by Secretary Henry M. 
Paulson, Jr. on Treasury and Federal Housing Finance Agency Action to Protect 
Financial Markets and Taxpayers (Sept. 7, 2008), http://www.treasury.gov/press-
center/press-releases/Pages/hp1129.aspx [http://perma.cc/X5DU-TLVC]. 
 62. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, § 1402, 124 Stat. 1376, 2138-39 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 
1639a-1639b (2012)). 
 63. Id. tit. XIV. 
 64. Id. § 1402. 
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that, at the time the loan is consummated, the consumer has a reasonable 
ability to repay the loan, according to its terms, and all applicable taxes, 
insurance (including mortgage guarantee insurance), and assessments.”65 
To ensure that mortgage lenders readopted prudent underwriting 
guidelines, Congress also provided for a private right of action against 
lenders by amending the Truth in Lending Act.66 As a result, any lender 
that fails to comply with this ability-to-repay rule may be held liable to 
the borrower for “actual damages, and the cost of any successful legal 
action together with reasonable attorney’s fees.”67 Lenders that fail to 
comply with the ability-to-repay rule may also be held liable for any of 
the following: 
 
(1) In an individual action, twice the amount of the finance charge 
involved.68 
(2) In an individual action relating to an open-end credit transaction 
that is not secured by real property or a dwelling, twice the amount of 
the finance charge involved, with a minimum of $500 and a maximum 
of $5000 or such higher amount as may be appropriate in the case of an 
established pattern or practice of such failure.69 
(3) In an individual action relating to a closed-end credit transaction 
secured by real property or a dwelling, not less than $400 and not more 
than $4000.70 
(4) In a class action, such amount as the court may allow (with no 
minimum recovery for each class member). The total amount of 
recovery in any class actions arising out of the same failure to comply 
by the same creditor, however, cannot be more than $1 million or 1% of 
the lender’s net worth, whichever is less.71 
 
Furthermore, the Truth in Lending Act also affords borrowers the 
right to assert a violation of its ability-to-repay standards “as a matter of 
defense by recoupment or setoff” against a foreclosure action. 72  In 
general, the amount of recoupment or setoff shall be equal to the amount 
																																																																																																																																
 65. Id. § 1411. 
 66. 15 U.S.C. § 1640. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. § 1640(a)(2)(A)(i). 
 69. Id. § 1640(a)(2)(A)(iii). 
 70. Id. § 1640(a)(2)(A)(iv). 
 71. Id. § 1640(a)(2)(B). 
 72. Id. § 1640(e). 
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that the borrower would be entitled to under 15 U.S.C. §1640(a) for a 
valid claim, plus the cost to the borrower of the action, including 
reasonable attorney’s fees.73 
2. Qualified Mortgage as a Safe Harbor 
To prevent lenders from having to defend against a vast number of 
suits for an alleged failure to comply with the ability-to-repay rule, 
Congress also provided lenders with a safe harbor.74 The Dodd-Frank 
Act carves out a presumption that if a loan satisfies the requirements of 
a qualified mortgage, the borrower has the ability to repay the loan.75 
Any loan that is accepted by a government sponsored entity, such as 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, will be considered a qualified mortgage 
even if its debt-to-income ratio is above 43%.76 Additionally, lenders 
can achieve a rebuttable presumption of compliance with the Truth in 
Lending Act’s ability-to-repay rule for “higher-priced” mortgage 
loans.77 
3. Qualified Mortgage Requirements 
In implementing Title XIV, the CFPB promulgated a definition for 
a qualified mortgage, meant to ensure that “residential borrowers only 
take loans that are suitable for them.”78 In order to be considered a 
qualified mortgage, the covered transaction must meet the following 
requirements: 
 
(1) The regular periodic payments for the loan are substantially 
equal;79 
																																																																																																																																
 73. Id. § 1640(k)(2)(A). 
 74. 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(e)(1) (2015). 
 75. Id. 
 76. See id. § 1026.43(e)(2)(vi); see also Kate Berry, Six Months Later, Does the 
QM Rule Still Matter?, NAT’L MORTGAGE NEWS (June 17, 2014, 12:22 PM), 
http://www.nationalmortgagenews.com/news/origination/six-months-later-does-the-qm 
-rule-still-matter-1041986-1.html [https://perma.cc/7CX6-JSPV]. 
 77. See 12 § 1026.43(e)(1)(ii); A “higher-priced” mortgage loan is defined as 
having an annual percentage rate that exceeds the average prime offer rate by 1.5 or 
more percentage points for first liens and 3.5 or more percentage points for second 
liens. See id. § 1026.35(a)(1). 
 78. See Weiser, supra note 3. 
 79. 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(e)(2)(i). 
426 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XXI 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
(2) the loan does not have any negative amortization, interest-only, 
or balloon features;80 
(3) the loan term does not exceed thirty years;81 
(4) the total points and fees do not exceed a specified percentage of 
the total loan amount, as listed in the regulation;82 
(5) the creditor underwrites the loan using the maximum interest 
rate that may apply during the first five years after the date on which the 
first regular periodic payment is due, and periodic payments of principal 
and interest that will repay either the outstanding principal balance over 
the remaining term of the loan as of the date the interest rate adjusts to 
the maximum or the loan amount over the loan;83 
(6) at or before consummation of the loan, the creditor considers 
and verifies the consumer’s income and assets, including employment 
status if relied upon, and current debt obligations, mortgage-related 
obligations, alimony and child support;84 and 
(7) the total debt-to-income ratio does not exceed 43%.85 
C. ALTERNATIVES TO QUALIFIED MORTGAGE RULE COMPLIANT LOANS 
For borrowers who are unable to satisfy the requirements of the 
CFPB’s qualified mortgage rule,86 a potential alternative option is to 
obtain a loan backed by the Department of Housing and Urban 
																																																																																																																																
 80. Id. § 1026.43(e)(2)(i)(A)-(C). 
 81. Id. § 1026.43(e)(2)(ii). 
 82. Id. § 1026.43(e)(2)(iii). For a loan greater than or equal to $100,000, the total 
points and fees cannot exceed 3% of the total loan amount. Id. § 1026.43(e)(3)(i)(A). 
For a loan greater than or equal to $60,000 but less than $100,000, the total points and 
fess cannot exceed $3000. Id. § 1026.43(e)(3)(i)(B). For a loan greater than or equal to 
$20,000 but less than $60,000, the total points and fees cannot exceed 5% of the total 
loan amount. Id. § 1026.43(e)(3)(i)(C). For a loan greater than or equal to $12,500 but 
less than $20,000, the total points and fees cannot exceed $1000. Id. § 
1026.43(e)(3)(i)(D). For a loan less than $12,500, the total points and fees cannot 
exceed 8% of the total loan amount. Id. § 1026.43(e)(3)(i)(E). 
 83. Id. § 1026.43(e)(2)(iv). 
 84. Id. § 1026.43(e)(2)(v). 
 85. Id. § 1026.43(e)(2)(vi). 
 86. At a minimum, 34% of Black borrowers and 32% of Hispanic borrowers are 
unable to satisfy the requirements of the CFPB’s qualified mortgage rule. See Neil 
Bhutta & Glenn B. Canner, Mortgage Market Conditions and Borrower Outcomes: 
Evidence from the 2012 HMDA Data and Matched HMDA–Credit Record Data, FED. 
RES. BULL., Nov. 2013, at 37. 
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Development (the “HUD”).87 In its qualified mortgage rule, the HUD 
chose not to adopt the CFPB’s 43% debt-to-income ratio in order to 
“remain consistent with [its] mission with respect to underserved 
borrowers.” 88  Instead, the HUD’s qualified mortgage rule allows 
borrowers with debt-to-income ratios above 43% to obtain a Federal 
Housing Administration (“FHA”) mortgage based upon “compensating 
factors.”89 Compensating factors that may be used to justify the approval 
of mortgages originated to borrowers with debt-to-income ratios above 
43% include: 
 
(1) verified and documented cash reserves; 
(2) minimal increase in housing payment; 
(3) no discretionary debt; 
(4) significant additional income not reflected in gross effective 
income; and 
(5) residual income.90 
 
																																																																																																																																
 87. 24 C.F.R. pts. 201, 203, 1005, 1007 (2015). 
 88. Qualified Mortgage Definition for HUD Insured and Guaranteed Single Family 
Mortgages, 78 Fed. Reg. 59,890, 59,897 (Sept. 30, 2013) (codified at 24 C.F.R. pts. 
201, 203, 1005, & 1007). Research has shown that underwriting criteria, such as debt-
to-income ratio, can limit minority access to homeownership. See ROBERTO G. 
QUERCIA, LEI DING & CAROLINA REID, CTR. FOR CMTY. CAPITAL ET AL., BALANCING 
RISK AND ACCESS: UNDERWRITING STANDARDS AND QUALIFIED RESIDENTIAL 
MORTGAGES 1, 10 (2012) (“setting low [debt-to-income] thresholds will serve to 
exclude primarily lower-income and minority borrowers”) (citing Zhu Xiao Di & X. 
Liu, Joint Ctr. for Hous. Studies, The Importance of Wealth and Income in the 
Transition to Homeownership (HUD Office of Policy Dev. & Research, Working Paper 
No. 05-6, 2005), http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/jchs.harvard.edu/files/w05-6.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/HQV6-T2XB]); see also Stuart S. Rosenthal, Eliminating Credit 
Barriers: How Far Can We Go?, in LOW INCOME HOMEOWNERSHIP: EXAMINING THE 
UNEXAMINED GOAL 111-45 (Nicholas P. Retsinas & Eric S. Belsky eds., 2002); 
Roberto G. Quercia et al., The Impacts of Affordable Lending Efforts on 
Homeownership Rates, 12 J. HOUS. ECON. 29, 29-59 (2003); Raphael W. Bostic et al., 
Hitting the Wall: Credit as an Impediment to Homeownership, in BUILDING ASSETS, 
BUILDING CREDIT: CREATING WEALTH IN LOW-INCOME COMMUNITIES 155-172 
(Nicholas P. Retsinas & Eric S. Belsky eds., 2005). 
 89. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., HUD MORTGAGEE LETTER 
2014-02, MANUAL UNDERWRITING (2014), http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/h 
uddoc?id=14-02ml.pdf [http://perma.cc/YV3G-J2S3]. 
 90. Id. at 11-13. 
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Although FHA mortgages present an alternative source of financing 
to borrowers who cannot satisfy the CFPB’s qualified mortgage rule, the 
requirements of the CFPB’s qualified mortgage rule may result in a dual 
lending market that unintentionally discriminates against Black and 
Hispanic borrowers.91 Current data provides that 34% of Black mortgage 
borrowers and 32% of Hispanic mortgage borrowers cannot satisfy the 
CFPB’s qualified mortgage rule based solely upon the 43% debt-to-
income ratio cap. 92  Thus, in order to obtain government-sponsored 
loans, which are accepted as qualified mortgage loans, these borrowers 
will be forced to obtain a FHA mortgage.93 If mortgages that satisfy the 
CFPB’s qualified mortgage rule and mortgages that satisfy the HUD’s 
qualified mortgage rule came at the same cost to borrowers, the 
differences between the two types of mortgages would likely be 
negligible; however, FHA mortgages are costlier than conventional 
loans.94 Additionally, Home Mortgage Disclosure Act data from 2012 
analyzed by the Federal Reserve Board revealed that over 78% of Black 
and over 70% of Hispanic residential real estate purchasers used a 
nonconventional loan, such as a FHA mortgage, to finance their 
purchase.95 As a result of being unable to meet the standards of the 
CFPB’s qualified mortgage rule, a larger percentage of Black and 
Hispanic borrowers may be forced to pay more money to obtain 
government-sponsored loans than both Asian and White borrowers.96 
Admittedly, government-sponsored loans are not the only means 
available to borrowers to finance the purchase of residential real estate.97 
																																																																																																																																
 91. See Rachel Witkowski, Blacks and Hispanics Likely to Be Hurt By ‘Qualified 
Mortgage’ Rule, NAT’L MORTGAGE NEWS (Oct. 22, 2013, 3:48 PM), http://www.nation 
almortgagenews.com/dailybriefing/blacks-and-hispanics-likely-to-be-hurt-by-qualified-
mortgage-rule-1039521-1.html?pg=1 [http://perma.cc/AE8B-Z8E8]. 
 92. See Bhutta & Canner, supra note 86, at 37 tbl. 15. 
 93. See 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(e)(2)(vi) (2015) (setting the maximum debt-to-income 
threshold for qualified mortgages at 43%). 
 94. See Kenneth R. Harney, Fee Increases Are Making FHA Mortgages More 
Expensive, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/feb/10/business 
/la-fi-harney-20130210 [http://perma.cc/LKV3-8LNV]; Witkowski, supra note 91. 
 95. Bhutta & Canner, supra note 86, at 26. 
 96. Id. at 4 (“lower-income borrowers and black and Hispanic-white borrowers 
were more likely than other groups to have debt-to-income ratios above 43[%].”). 
 97. See Brena Swanson, Non-QM Lending: The New Normal For Mortgages?, 
HOUSINGWIRE (Aug. 6, 2014, 12:05 PM), http://www.housingwire.com/articles/30937-
non-qm-lending-the-new-normal-for-mortgages [http://perma.cc/64H3-WWUV] (non-
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Borrowers may seek private mortgages that are not sponsored by the 
government.98 However, the availability of private mortgages does not 
offer a solution to the difference in cost between mortgages that satisfy 
the CFPB’s qualified mortgage rule and FHA mortgages.99 Fannie Mae, 
Freddie Mac, and the HUD all have a preferable cost of capital to any 
private mortgage originator. 100  Therefore, borrower’s can reasonably 
expect any private mortgage to cost more than a loan compliant with 
either of the qualified mortgage rules.101 As a result of being unable to 
meet the standards of the CFPB’s qualified mortgage rule, a larger 
percentage of Black and Hispanic borrowers may be forced to pay more 
money to obtain mortgages, qualified or unqualified, than both Asian 
and White borrowers.102 
Consequently, two problems arise when borrowers are faced with 
these options. First, the creation of two different markets, one for Black 
and Hispanic borrowers, and the other for Asian and White borrowers is 
a problematic social policy.103 Legal differentiation amongst borrowers 
that results in segregated pools of borrowers (supported by adherence to 
the CFPB’s qualified mortgage rule) may easily enable more nefarious 
discrimination against Black and Hispanic borrowers. 104  Second, 
research indicates that the discretion held by mortgage originators has 
led to creditworthy Black and Hispanic borrowers paying more for 
mortgages than similarly situated Asian and White borrowers.105 The 
																																																																																																																																
qualified mortgage lending constitutes roughly 10% of current mortgage originations, 
valued at approximately $50 billion per year). 
 98. Id. 
 99. See Witkowski, supra note 91. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. See Bhutta & Canner, supra note 86, at 4. 
 103. See id. at 25 (“concerns have been raised about the possibility that lenders steer 
borrowers in certain neighborhoods toward government-backed loans.”). 
 104. Id. 
 105. See Charlie Savage, Wells Fargo Will Settle Mortgage Bias Charges, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jul. 12, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/13/business/wells-fargo-to-
settle-mortgage-discrimination-charges.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/MNR5-WZ85] 
(“mortgage brokers . . . charged higher fees and rates to more than 30,000 minority 
borrowers across the country than they had to white borrowers who posed the same 
credit risk . . . .”); Associated Press, Study: Blacks, Latinos Pay More For Mortgages, 
NBC NEWS (Jun. 6, 2006 3:43 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/13081865/ns/business 
-real_estate/t/study-blacks-latinos-pay-more-mortgages/#.Vj6WsRCrQ6g [http://perma. 
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disparity in cost between CFPB’s qualified mortgages and FHA 
mortgages 106  creates the possibility that mortgage originators may 
discriminate against minority borrowers in the cost of credit, under the 
guise of complying with the CFPB’s qualified mortgage rule.107 As a 
result, the new mortgage rules have had unintended implications. 
II. CONFLICTS 
A. ARGUMENTS AGAINST QUALIFIED MORTGAGE RULE 
1. The Safe Harbor in the Qualified Mortgage Rule Will Discourage the 
Origination of Non-Qualified Mortgage Rule Loans 
By providing lenders with a safe harbor, there is a disincentive for 
lenders to originate loans that do not meet the CFPB’s qualified 
mortgage rule requirements.108  In fact, the CFPB concedes that it is 
“concerned that creditors may initially be reluctant to make loans that 
are not qualified mortgages, even though they are responsibly 
underwritten.”109 For lenders that offer “higher-priced” mortgages, they 
																																																																																																																																
cc/N75D-E2QN] (“Black and Hispanic home buyers are more likely to pay high 
mortgage rates than white borrowers with similar credit ratings and income levels . . . 
.”); Sandra Fleishman, Minorities Often Pay More for Mortgages, WASH. POST (Sept. 
14, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/13/AR2005 
091302070.html [http://perma.cc/ME8L-89WU] (analysis of home-lending data found 
that “after adjusting for factors such as income level, loan size and property location 
that could raise the interest rate offered on a mortgage, blacks are still nearly twice as 
likely as whites to be given a high-cost loan.”). 
 106. See Harney, supra note 94. 
 107. See Rachel Witkowski, Lawmakers Voice Support for Disparate Impact, NAT’L 
MORTGAGE NEWS (Nov. 20, 2013), http://www.nationalmortgagenews.com/dailybriefin 
g/Lawmakers-Voice-Support-for-Disparate-Impact-1039982-1.html [http://perma.cc/T2 
WJ-Q5SF] (regarding disparate impact in lending, Rep. Emanuel Cleaver of Missouri 
said, “nobody is going to admit discrimination . . . [s]o if nobody admits it then they are 
either unintentionally committing it—committing discriminatory acts—or they are 
denying that what they’re doing is in fact discriminatory.”). 
 108. Diane Katz, Dodd-Frank Mortgage Rules Unleash Predatory Regulators, THE 
HERITAGE FOUND. (Dec. 16, 2003), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/12/d 
oddfrank-mortgage-rules-unleash-predatory-regulators#_ftn27 [http://perma.cc/4NGT-
JM9X] (“The relative safety of the QM means that lenders will be far less likely to offer 
loans that do not meet the QM criteria.”). 
 109. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, SUMMARY OF THE ABILITY-TO-REPAY AND 
QUALIFIED MORTGAGE RULE AND THE CONCURRENT PROPOSAL 5 (2013), http://files.co 
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are only protected by a “rebuttable presumption” of compliance with the 
ability-to-repay rule, therefore they also face the risk of litigation.110 
Conversely, each loan that is originated that conforms to the qualified 
mortgage rule provides the lender with the guarantee that the lender will 
not be subject to any suit for an alleged failure to comply with the 
ability-to-repay rule.111 When juxtaposed, it becomes clear that lenders 
will opt to originate loans that satisfy the qualified mortgage rule 
requirements so as to be afforded the protection of the safe harbor.112 
Moreover, the final qualified residential mortgage rule gave lenders 
further incentive to originate loans that conform to the qualified 
mortgage rule.113 The qualified residential mortgage rule lays out the 
requirements for mortgages to be pooled for securitization.114 The rule is 
an exemption to the Dodd-Frank Act’s risk retention rules that require 
lenders to retain 5% of the loans they sell into the secondary mortgage 
market.115 Although the initially proposed rules for a qualified mortgage 
and a qualified residential mortgage differed, the recently promulgated 
final qualified residential mortgage rule was designed to align with the 
qualified mortgage rule. 116  This gives lenders further incentive to 
originate loans that conform to the qualified mortgage rule (and also the 




 110. SEAN M. HOSKINS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43081, THE ABILITY-TO-REPAY 
RULE: POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF THE QUALIFIED MORTGAGE DEFINITION ON CREDIT 
AVAILABILITY AND OTHER SELECTED ISSUES 5 (2014), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/ 
R43081.pdf [http://perma.cc/7QA7-3M3L]; Potential for Increased Litigation Risk 
Under the Ability to Repay Rule for Mortgage Lenders as a Result of the Affordable 
Care Act, MD & DC CREDIT UNION ASS’N (Mar. 17, 2014), http://www.mddccua.org/c 
ommunications-exchange/press-room/6152 [http://perma.cc/947C-H9MN] (“Mortgage 
lenders will need to take a serious look at the litigation risk associated with offering 
higher-priced qualified mortgages.”). 
 111. 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(e)(1)(i) (2015); see also Rachel Witkowski, ‘Safe Harbor’ 
for QM Loans May Not Protect Banks, NAT’L MORTGAGE NEWS (Sept. 6, 2013), 
http://www.nationalmortgagenews.com/dailybriefing/Safe-Harbor-QM-Loans-May-Not 
-Protect-Banks-1038649-1.html [http://perma.cc/XL65-KCEL]. 
 112. See Katz, supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
 113. Kevin L. Petrasic, Dodd-Frank Securitization Rule Is a Win for Banks, 
LAW360 (Nov. 6, 2014, 1:32 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/593766/dodd-frank-
securitization-rule-is-a-win-for-banks [http://perma.cc/2PF8-NBCF]. 
 114. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11(c)(1) (2012). 
 115. Id. § 78o-11(c)(4)(B). 
 116. Credit Risk Retention, 79 Fed. Reg. 77,602, 77,686 (Dec. 24, 2014). 
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securitized in the secondary market. 117  To the contrary, lenders are 
required to retain 5% of the credit risk for loans that are not eligible to 
be designated as a qualified mortgage (and are similarly incapable of the 
qualified residential mortgage designation).118 Thus, in order to avoid 
this requirement, lenders will originate mortgages that conform to the 
qualified residential mortgage rule, and by default, the qualified 
mortgage rule.  
2. The 43% Debt-To-Income Threshold Will Unduly Preclude 
Creditworthy Borrowers From Obtaining Qualified Mortgages 
By singularly emphasizing a borrower’s debt-to-income ratio, the 
qualified mortgage rule fails to take into account other underwriting 
criteria that are salient to a borrower’s ability to repay his loan. 119 
Although a borrower’s debt-to-income ratio is usually one factor taken 
into account during the underwriting process,120 multiple other borrower 
characteristics also factor into the underwriting process, including, but 
not limited to (1) loan-to-value ratio, (2) credit rating, (3) residual 
income, (4) liquid cash reserves, and (5) past payment history. 121 
Research has shown that a borrower’s inability to satisfy the current 
debt-to-income ratio does not mean that the borrower will be incapable 
of repaying his or her mortgage.122 When loan-to-value ratio, total loan 
amount, and a borrower’s credit score are all considered during the 
underwriting process, borrowers with a debt-to-income ratio between 
43% and 45% were only slightly more likely to become delinquent on 
loan payments than borrowers with a debt-to-income ratio between 36% 
and 40%.123 The CFPB itself has acknowledged that Federal Reserve 
Board research shows that “debt-to-income ratios may not have 
significant predictive power once the effects of credit history, loan type, 
																																																																																																																																
 117. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o–11(c)(1)(C)(iii). 
 118. Credit Risk Retention, 79 Fed. Reg. at 77,603. 
 119. See Ctr. for Responsible Lending et al., supra note 4, at 11. 
 120. See generally FANNIE MAE, ELIGIBILITY MATRIX (2015), http://www.fanniemae 
.com/content/eligibility_information/eligibility-matrix.pdf [http://perma.cc/7HSQ-8UN 
H]. 
 121. See Ctr. for Responsible Lending et al., supra note 4, at 1, 5-6, 24. 
 122. See id. at 1, 15. 
 123. Id. at 15. 
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and loan-to-value are considered.”124 Moreover, not only have loan-to-
value ratios and a borrower’s credit score been found to be more 
indicative of future loan performance than a borrower’s debt-to-income 
ratio,125 but a borrower’s past payment history, residual income, and 
liquid cash reserves can also signal a borrowers’ ability to repay a 
mortgage, even at debt-to-income ratios between 43% and 50%.126 By 
exclusively focusing upon a borrower’s debt-to-income ratio, the 
qualified mortgage rule unnecessarily denies potential creditworthy 
borrowers the opportunity to obtain a qualified mortgage.127 
Additionally, the qualified mortgage rule’s 43% debt-to-income 
threshold is too rigid. 128  When the Federal Reserve Board initially 
contemplated implementing a quantitative debt-to-income ratio as part 
of the rule,129 the Board was concerned that “setting a specific debt-to-
income ratio or residual income level could limit credit availability 
without providing adequate off-setting benefits.”130 Currently, between 
																																																																																																																																
 124. Ability-to-Repay and Qualified Mortgage Standards Under the Truth in 
Lending Act (Regulation Z), 78 Fed. Reg. 6408 (Jan. 30, 2013); see also Yuliya 
Demyanyk & Otto Van Hemert, Understanding the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 24 REV. 
FIN. STUD. 1848 (2011); James A. Berkovec et al., Race, Redlining, and Residential 
Mortgage Loan Performance, 9 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 263 (1994). 
 125. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule to Implement the 
Ability to Repay/Qualified Mortgage Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, at 9 (July 9, 2012), http://mba.informz.net/MBA/ 
data/images/qmcommentletter070912.pdf [http://perma.cc/KY4Y-XL4Y]. 
 126. See Ctr. for Responsible Lending et al., supra note 4. 
 127. See Demyanyk & Van Hemert, supra note 124; Berkovec et al., supra note 
124; Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, supra note 125; Ctr. for Responsible Lending et al., 
supra note 4. 
 128. See Ctr. for Responsible Lending et al., supra note 4, at 15 (stating that the 
organization found “no statistical difference in the likelihood of delinquency among 
loans with a [debt-to-income] of between 40 and 43[%] and those with a [debt-to-
income] between 36 and 40[%]” and that “loans with a [debt-to-income] of between 43 
and 45[%] were only marginally more likely to become delinquent than loans with a 
[debt-to-income] between 36 and 40[%].”). 
 129. On July 21, 2011, rulemaking responsibility was transferred from the Federal 
Reserve Board to the then newly established CFPB. See Mortgage Origination: 
Hearing Before Subcomm. on Ins., Hous., & Cmty. Opportunity of the H. Comm. on 
Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 12 (2011) (statement of Sandra F. Braunstein, Director, 
Division of Consumer & Community Affairs), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newseven 
ts/testimony/braunstein20110713a.htm [http://perma.cc/9T79-TZ6Z]. 
 130. Ability-to-Repay and Qualified Mortgage Standards Under the Truth in 
Lending Act (Regulation Z), 78 Fed. Reg. 6408, 6525 (Jan. 30, 2013). 
434 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XXI 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
15% and 20% of the mortgage market is comprised of loans above the 
43% debt-to-income ratio, and some of these loans perform well.131 
Additionally, 23% of the loans acquired by Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac between 1997 and 2009 had debt-to-income ratios of 44% or more, 
while 19% of those loans had debt-to-income ratios equal to or 
exceeding 46%.132 Despite the CFPB’s admission that no “magic” debt-
to-income ratio exists that separates “affordable from unaffordable 
mortgages,”133 they still opted to implement a fixed threshold based on a 
general “gradual increase in delinquency rates as debt-to-income ratios 
increase.”134 However, there is only a negligible difference between a 
debt-to-income ratio of 42% and 45%.135 In fact, borrowers possessing 
debt-to-income ratios over 43% with ample residual income and liquid 
reserves have been shown to perform better than borrowers with debt-to-
income ratios below 43% who did not meet these tests.136 Additionally, 
even though loans underwritten with a debt-to-income ratio of over 46% 
are correlated with higher delinquency rates,137 Fannie Mae continues to 
purchase loans originated to borrowers with debt-to-income ratios as 
high as 50%.138 This is further evidence that undercuts the value of the 
current ratio. Therefore, by instituting an inflexible debt-to-income 
threshold in the qualified mortgage rule, the CFPB has placed too much 
importance on the correlation between delinquency rates and debt-to-
																																																																																																																																
 131. See Witkowski, supra note 91. 
 132. Katz, supra note 108. 
 133. Ability-to-Repay and Qualified Mortgage Standards Under the Truth in 
Lending Act (Regulation Z), 78 Fed. Reg. at 6527. 
 134. Id.; see also Truth in Lending (Regulation Z), 77 Fed. Reg. 33,120, 33,122 to 
33,123 (June 5, 2012) (summarizing the HLP dataset by volume of loans and 
percentage that were ever sixty days or more delinquent, tabulated by the total debt-to-
income on the loans and year of origination). 
 135. Katz, supra note 108. 
 136. See Ctr. for Responsible Lending et al., supra note 4, at 18. 
 137. Id. at 14. 
 138. Fannie Mae will purchase non-HARP loans underwritten by Desktop 
Underwriter that meet credit and collateral tests with compensating factors even if a 
borrower’s debt-to-income is less than or equal to 50%. See FANNIE MAE, PRIVATE 
MORTGAGE INSURER ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS 41 (2015), http://www.fanniemae.co 
m/content/eligibility_information/private-mortgage-insurer-eligibility-requirements.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/UQR3-B2PU]. 
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income ratios above 43%,139 despite evidence that loans to borrowers 
with debt-to-income ratios above this threshold can be successful.140 
B. ANTICIPATED EFFECTS OF QUALIFIED MORTGAGE RULE: RACE AND 
AFFLUENCE CORRELATION 
Although the qualified mortgage rule is intended to ensure that 
borrowers receive loans that they are capable of repaying, 141  the 
qualified mortgage rule may ultimately be shown to adversely affect 
minority borrowers.142 Mortgage lending has decreased after the rule 
became effective in January 2014.143 Although some critics point to the 
implementation of the qualified mortgage rule as the cause of the 
decrease in mortgage lending, alternative explanations for the decrease 
in mortgage origination include (1) a sluggish economy, (2) student loan 
debt, (3) tepid income growth, (4) borrower obligations to underwater 
mortgages (meaning that the outstanding balance remaining on the loan 
exceeds the market value of the property), (5) fewer mortgage 
originators,144  (6) the increased cost to originate a loan, and (7) the 
removal of unconventional loans from the marketplace.145 Furthermore, 
it has been proffered that minority borrowers have not been impacted by 
the qualified mortgage rule 146  because there is also a seven-year 
exemption granted to loans accepted by the government-sponsored 
enterprises’ automated underwriting engines (due to the fact that loans 
with a debt-to-income ratio above 43% can still be approved by the 
																																																																																																																																
 139. See Ctr. for Responsible Lending et al., supra note 4, at 15. 
 140. See id.; Demyanyk & Van Hemert, supra note 124; Berkovec et al., supra note 
124; Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, supra note 125. 
 141. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, §§ 1411-1412, 124 Stat. 1376, 2142-48 (2010). 
 142. See Witkowski, supra note 91. 
 143. See Berry, supra note 76. 
 144. The qualified mortgage rule’s requirement that total points and fees do not 
exceed 3% of the total loan amount is alleged to: (1) “disproportionately affect smaller 
loans” and the community banks that primarily originate them; and (2) be the cause of 
lowered profits for mortgage brokers, resulting in an estimated 30% fewer mortgage 
originators still operating by the end of 2015. See Berry, supra note 76. 
 145. See Berry, supra note 76. 
 146. Id. 
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automated underwriting engines of either Fannie Mae or Freddie 
Mac).147 
Despite various causes being attributed to the decrease in mortgage 
origination since the implementation of the qualified mortgage rule, the 
projected effects of the qualified mortgage are much more concentrated 
than an “across the board” 148  decrease in lending. 149  Although the 
qualified mortgage rule is neutral on its face, the rule will 
disproportionately impact less affluent borrowers, a significant portion 
of which tend to be minority borrowers.150 
To begin, a projected disproportionate impact upon less affluent 
borrowers correlates directly with a projected disproportionate impact 
upon minority borrowers.151 Real median household incomes for both 
Black and Hispanic households are lower than the real median 
household incomes of both Asian and White households.152 Even more 
striking is the gap between the median net worth of White households 
($141,900) compared to the median net worth of Hispanic households 
($13,700) and Black households ($11,000) in 2013. 153  Furthermore, 
between 2010 and 2013, the median wealth of Black and Hispanic 
households fell, while the median wealth of White households 
increased.154  As a result, a larger percentage of Black and Hispanic 
borrowers will be less affluent than the percentage of Asian and White 
borrowers who are less affluent.155 
																																																																																																																																
 147. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, EXAMINATION PROCEDURES: MORTGAGE 
ORIGINATION 6 (2014), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201401_cfpb_mortgage-origi 
nation-exam-procedures.pdf [http://perma.cc/WDE2-FWVM]. 
 148. See Berry, supra note 76. 
 149. See Witkowski, supra note 91. 
 150. Id. 
 151. See DENAVAS-WALT & PROCTOR, supra note 6; Kochhar & Fry, supra note 6. 
 152. In 2013, the real median household income by race was as follows: Asian: 
$67,065; White: $58,270; Hispanic: $40,963; Black: $34,598. See DENAVAS-WALT & 
PROCTOR, supra note 6, at 61 tbl. D-1. 
 153. See Kochhar & Fry, supra note 6. 
 154. Median wealth of White households increased by 2.4% from $138,600 to 
$141,900; median wealth of Black households fell 33.7%, from $16,600 to $11,000; 
median wealth of Hispanic households fell 14.3%, from $16,000 to $13,700. See 
Kochhar & Fry, supra note 6. Please note that the author does not mean to imply that 
the disparity in the growth rate of median household wealth by race is attributable to 
either the Dodd-Frank Act or the qualified mortgage rule. Rather, this is only meant to 
further illustrate the correlation between affluence and race. 
 155. See DENAVAS-WALT & PROCTOR, supra note 6; Kochhar & Fry, supra note 6. 
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Additionally, lower-income borrowers who applied for a loan in 
2010 were more likely to exceed the 43% debt-to-income ratio limit.156 
Not only were mortgage denial rates “significantly higher” for Black 
and Hispanic mortgage applicants, 157  but those Black and Hispanic 
borrowers who were approved for a mortgage were more likely to have 
a higher priced mortgage compared to either Asian or White 
borrowers. 158  Not surprisingly, Home Mortgage Disclosure Act data 
from 2012 analyzed by the Federal Reserve Board revealed that Black 
and Hispanic mortgage borrowers also had lower credit scores and 
higher delinquency rates on mortgages than Asian and White borrowers 
in 2012.159 Looking ahead, the Federal Reserve Board’s analysis also 
found that in 2010 34% of Black mortgage borrowers and 32% of 
Hispanic mortgage borrowers would be ineligible for a qualified 
mortgage based solely on their inability to satisfy the 43% debt-to-
income requirement.160 
Despite these statistics, some claim that the qualified mortgage rule 
will not impact minority borrowers because any government-sponsored 
loan is considered to be a qualified mortgage.161 The Federal Reserve 
Board’s analysis of Home Mortgage Disclosure Act data noted that 70% 
of the 22% of residential mortgage borrowers who would not meet the 
qualified mortgage rule’s required debt-to-income ratio would still 
obtain government-sponsored loans,162 which are accepted as qualified 
mortgage loans during the seven-year exemption, or until Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac are removed from conservatorship, whichever comes 
first. 163  Although any government-sponsored loan is currently 
considered to be a qualified mortgage, there is no indication of what will 
happen to Black and Hispanic borrowers who cannot satisfy the 43% 
																																																																																																																																
 156. See Bhutta & Canner, supra note 86, at 4. 
 157. Id. at 3 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id.; Notably, the delinquency rates of Black and Hispanic borrowers remain 
higher than the delinquency rates of Asian and White borrowers even after controlling 
for borrower credit score, geographic reductions in home value, and “higher-priced loan 
status.” See id. 
 160. Id. at 37. 
 161. See Berry, supra note 76; see also CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 
147, at 6. 
 162. See Bhutta & Canner, supra note 86, at 40. Included within this 22% are 33% 
of Black borrowers and 31% of Hispanic borrowers. Id. at 37. 
 163. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 147, at 6. 
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debt-to-income ratio when the seven-year exemption has ended or when 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are removed from conservatorship. 164 
Some hope that stronger economic conditions, such as healthy growth in 
salaries, employment, and the value of residential real estate, will result 
in a decreased percentage of borrowers who cannot satisfy the debt-to-
income ratio.165 Although the prospect of improved economic conditions 
may provide hope to some of the 34% of Black borrowers and 32% of 
Hispanic borrowers who currently cannot satisfy the debt-to-income 
ratio, these borrowers have neither a guarantee of stronger economic 
conditions in the future166 nor a guarantee that their loans will remain 
qualified mortgages when the seven-year exemption has ended or 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are removed from conservatorship.167 
C. POTENTIAL SOURCES OF FUTURE LITIGATION: THE FAIR HOUSING ACT 
AND THE EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY ACT 
Mortgage lenders are fearful of being prosecuted for violations of 
the Fair Housing Act or the Equal Credit Opportunity Act.168 The Fair 
Housing Act makes it illegal to “discriminate against any person in the 
terms, conditions, or privileges of sale . . . of a dwelling . . . because of 
race, color . . . or national origin.”169 Notably, in Texas Department of 
Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 
the Supreme Court held that “[r]ecognition of disparate-impact claims is 
consistent with the [Fair Housing Act’s] central purpose,” noting that 
the Fair Housing Act “was enacted to eradicate discriminatory practices 
within a sector of our Nation’s economy.”170 Similarly, the Equal Credit 
																																																																																																																																
 164. See Witkowski, supra note 91. 
 165. Id.; see also Berry, supra note 76; Brad Finkelstein, MBA Cuts Loan Forecast 
Again, Cites Lagging Home Purchases, NAT’L MORTGAGE NEWS (May 19, 2014), 
http://www.nationalmortgagenews.com/news/origination/mba-cuts-loan-forecast-again-
cites-lagging-home-purchases-1041815-1.html [http://perma.cc/83KH-WMWQ]. 
 166. Improvement in borrower credit score customarily occurs only over a gradual 
period of time. See Bhutta & Canner, supra note 86, at 4. Although “financial assets, 
such as stocks,” have regained their value following the recession, they are “much more 
likely” to be owned by White borrowers than either Black or Hispanic borrowers. See 
Kochhar & Fry, supra note 6. 
 167. See Witkowski, supra note 91. 
 168. See Witkowski, supra note 107. 
 169. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (2012). 
 170. Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 
135 S. Ct. 2507, 2521 (2015) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 3601); see also H.R. REP. 100-711 
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Opportunity Act makes it unlawful for a lender to discriminate against 
an applicant on the basis of race, color, or national origin.171 
Lenders may be apprehensive about the possibility of facing suits 
under either the Fair Housing Act or the Equal Credit Opportunity 
Act.172 In a potential lawsuit, lenders would face liability either for not 
offering qualified mortgages loans to a larger percentage of Black and 
Hispanic applicants due to their inability to meet the 43% debt-to-
income requirement,173 or for pricing loans to applicants with a debt-to-
income ratio above 43% more expensively on account of the higher risk 
associated with the borrower.174 These fears, however, are unfounded.175 
In Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs, the Supreme 
Court explicitly held: 
[A] disparate-impact claim that relies on a statistical disparity must 
fail if the plaintiff cannot point to a defendant’s policy or policies 
causing that disparity. A robust causality requirement ensures that 
‘[r]acial imbalance . . . does not, without more, establish a prima 
																																																																																																																																
(1988), as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2176 (stating that the Fair Housing 
Act “provides a clear national policy against discrimination in housing”). 
 171. See 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2012). Although the Supreme Court’s reasoning in 
Texas Department of Housing & Community Affairs regarding the Fair Housing Act 
may be applicable to the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, there are reasons to believe that 
the Supreme Court may not allow for disparate impact claims to be brought pursuant to 
the Equal Credit Opportunity Act. See Special Alert: Disparate Impact Under The 
Equal Credit Opportunity Act After Inclusive Communities, BUCKLEYSANDLER LLP 
(June 27, 2015), http://buckleysandler.com/news-detail/special-alert-disparate-impact-
under-the-equal-credit-opportunity-act-after-inclusive-communities [http://perma.cc/ZH 
9G-H5TG]. 
 172. See Witkowski, supra note 91; Witkowski, supra note 107; Evan Weinberger, 
Feds Say QM Loans Won’t Spur Fair Lending Suits, LAW360 (Oct. 22, 2013, 6:37 PM), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/482337/feds-say-qm-loans-won-t-spur-fair-lending-sui 
ts [http://perma.cc/94AV-3M7L]. 
 173. Evan Weinberger, Banks Fear CFPB Rule Could Spur Fair Lending Fights, 
LAW360 (Feb. 21, 2013, 7:47 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/417424 [http://per 
ma.cc/6VJY-Q5XV]. 
 174. See Marcus McCue, It’s Time to Get Serious About Non-QM Loans, 
HOUSINGWIRE (Apr. 15, 2014), http://www.housingwire.com/blogs/1-rewired/post/296 
75-its-time-to-get-serious-about-non-qm-loans [http://perma.cc/53U6-HZ2K] (“With 
non-QM comes more risk”); Understanding Mortgage Loan Underwriting, HUD 
EXCHANGE, http://www.hudexchange.info/resource/797/understanding-mortgage-loan-u 
nderwriting/ [http://perma.cc/JRZ2-ACAH] (“The key to profitable mortgage lending is 
pricing loans according to their risk of default.”). 
 175. See Weinberger, supra note 172. 
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facie case of disparate impact’ and thus protects defendants from 
being held liable for racial disparities they did not create.176 
A mortgage originator will not be held liable for a violation of the Fair 
Housing Act under a disparate impact theory because it is not the 
mortgage originator’s policy that is causing the racial imbalance, but 
rather it is the mortgage originator’s compliance with the CFPB’s 
qualified mortgage rule that is the source of the racial imbalance.177 
Therefore, fears of being prosecuted for violations of the Fair Housing 
Act or the Equal Credit Opportunity Act for complying with the CFPB’s 
qualified mortgage rule are both misguided and farfetched.178 
Further, Congress’ inability to advance reforms regarding Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac has aroused concern that the seven-year 
exemption granted to the qualified mortgage rule will toll without a 
solution for the large number of mortgages backed by Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac. Under the current exemption, a loan with a debt-to-income 
ratio exceeding 43% may still receive an automated underwriting 
approval, despite the debt-to-income ratio exceeding the qualified 
mortgage rule limit.179 This is significant because the Dodd-Frank Act 
creates a presumption that if a loan is a qualified mortgage then the 
borrower has the ability to repay the loan.180 Lenders fear that at the 
expiration of the seven-year exemption, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
will determine that automated underwriting approvals are insufficient to 
achieve qualified mortgage status on account of the debt-to-income ratio 
of a loan actually exceeding threshold limit.181 Under this scenario, not 
only would lenders be required to repurchase the mortgage from the 
government-sponsored enterprise,182 but the repurchased loan may also 
lose its presumption that the borrower had the ability to repay the loan at 
the time of origination.183 
																																																																																																																																
 176. Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 
135 S. Ct. 2507, 2523 (2015) (citing Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 
653 (1989)). 
 177. See Weinberger, supra note 172. 
 178. Id. 
 179. See Berry, supra note 76; see also CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 
147, at 6. 
 180. 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(e)(1)(i) (2015). 
 181. See Berry, supra note 76. 
 182. See id. 
 183. See 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(e)(2). Furthermore, it is worth noting that lenders may 
have a reliance interest in the qualified mortgage status of loans approved by 
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Although this situation is only supposition for the moment, it still 
highlights an important dilemma for mortgage originators. Lenders are 
currently relying upon the qualified mortgage status for loans approved 
by government-sponsored enterprises’ automated underwriting engines 
to afford them a safe harbor.184 To enable mortgage lenders to properly 
assess their exposure to litigation, the qualified mortgage rule should be 
amended to clarify what will happen to loans with a debt-to-income 
ratio exceeding 43% that receive an automated underwriting approval 
after the expiration of the seven-year exemption or when Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac are removed from conservatorship.185 If these loans are 
to lose their qualified mortgage status, lenders should be put on notice, 
as this will afford them the opportunity to modify their loan origination 
practices.186 This, in turn, will ensure that lenders are not exposed to 
ability-to-repay litigation for loans issued under the misconception that 
they would satisfy the qualified mortgage rule despite debt-to-income 
ratios exceeding 43%.187 
III. RESOLUTION: PROPOSALS TO PROVIDE EQUAL ACCESS TO CREDIT 
FOR CREDITWORTHY MINORITY BORROWERS 
Having identified that (1) the qualified mortgage rule’s creation of 
a safe harbor will discourage the origination of non-qualified mortgage 
rule loans,188 (2) the 43% debt-to-income threshold will unduly preclude 
creditworthy borrowers from obtaining qualified mortgages,189 and (3) 
the qualified mortgage rule is projected to disproportionately impact less 
																																																																																																																																
government-sponsored enterprises’ automated underwriting engines. See Omnia 
Commercial Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 502, 508 (1923) (holding that a contract 
interest represents “property” within the meaning of the Takings Clause). Thus, if 
Fannie Mae and/or Freddie Mac determine that the automated underwriting approval of 
a loan is invalid on account of the debt-to-income ratio of the loan exceeding the 43% 
qualified mortgage rule limit, the loss of the safe harbor protections that were 
previously afforded to the lender may be found to constitute a taking of property. 
 184. See Berry, supra note 76; Brian Collins, Final QM Rule Will Keep the GSE 
Loan Market Going for Years, NAT’L MORTGAGE NEWS (Jan. 10, 2013), 
http://www.nationalmortgagenews.com/dailybriefing/final-qm-rule-favors-gses-103380 
7-1.html [http://perma.cc/69XZ-CR67]. 
 185. See Berry, supra note 76. 
 186. See id. 
 187. Id.; 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(e)(1)(i). 
 188. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 189. See supra Part II.A.2. 
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affluent borrowers, and consequently more minority borrowers,190 it is 
apparent that alternative options to the inflexible debt-to-income 
requirements of the qualified mortgage rule must be identified.191  In 
crafting alternative solutions, it is necessary to ensure that borrowers 
receive a loan that they are capable of repaying, fulfilling the intent of 
the qualified mortgage rule, 192  while also making certain that low 
income consumers who are unable to comply with the 43% debt-to-
income ratio, but who are otherwise creditworthy, are not improperly 
excluded from obtaining qualified mortgages.193 
A. ALLOW FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF COMPENSATING FACTORS 
Although the CFPB settled on an unwavering 43% debt-to-income 
threshold in the qualified mortgage rule, the CFPB also points out “that 
there are many instances in which individual consumers can afford a 
debt-to-income ratio above 43[%] based on their particular 
circumstances,”194  and that “the [CFPB] emphasizes that it does not 
believe that a 43[%] debt-to-income ratio represents the outer boundary 
of responsible lending.”195 With this information in mind, the CFPB 
should heed its own advice and allow for the consideration of the 
compensating factors of individual borrowers in order to enable them to 
receive qualified mortgages.196 Although a borrower’s debt-to-income 
ratio is usually one factor taken into account during the underwriting 
process,197 multiple other borrower characteristics should factor into the 
underwriting process, including, but not limited to (1) loan to value 
ratio, (2) credit score, (3) residual income, (4) liquid cash reserves, and 
(5) past payment history.198 
																																																																																																																																
 190. See supra Part II.B. 
 191. See Ctr. for Responsible Lending, supra note 4; Cmty. Depository Inst. 
Advisory Council, supra note 5; Nat’l Cmty. Reinvestment Coal., supra note 5. 
 192. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 109, at 1 (“The Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau is issuing a final rule to implement laws requiring 
mortgage lenders to consider consumers’ ability to repay home loans before extending 
them credit.”). 
 193. See Witkowski, supra note 91. 
 194. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 109, at 5. 
 195. Ability-to-Repay and Qualified Mortgage Standards Under the Truth in 
Lending Act (Regulation Z), 78 Fed. Reg. 6408, 6527 (Jan. 30, 2013). 
 196. See Ctr. for Responsible Lending et al., supra note 4. 
 197. See FANNIE MAE, supra note 120. 
 198. See Ctr. for Responsible Lending et al., supra note 4. 
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State programs, such as the Connecticut Housing Finance 
Agency 199  and the Virginia Housing Development Authority, 200  can 
serve as examples for the CFPB of how to reconcile these additional 
compensating factors with the debt-to-income threshold when 
determining whether a loan is entitled to the qualified mortgage 
classification. Under the Connecticut Housing Finance Agency regime, 
underwriting requirements demand the review of compensating factors 
such as a borrower’s (1) capacity to afford a substantial down payment, 
(2) established capability to accrue savings, or (3) significant recorded 
cash reserves for consumers with debt-to-income ratios that surpass the 
Connecticut Housing Finance Agency’s debt-to-income ratio limits.201 
Similarly, under the Virginia Housing Development Authority regime, 
underwriting protocols allow underwriters to approve loans to 
consumers whose debt-to-income ratios exceed the Virginia Housing 
Development Authority’s debt-to-income ratio limits by up to 2% by 
taking into consideration factors such as a borrower’s (1) employment 
and income, (2) credit history, (3) availability of liquid savings to 
complete a transaction, and (4) monthly housing expenditures.202  By 
modifying its qualified mortgage requirements to be more similar to 
those of either the Connecticut Housing Finance Agency or the Virginia 
Housing Development Authority, the CFPB will cease to unnecessarily 
prohibit less affluent, and consequently more minority borrowers, who 
are otherwise creditworthy, from obtaining qualified mortgages simply 
due to an inability to satisfy the current debt-to-income ratio.203 
B. CREATION OF LOSS RESERVES BY LENDERS 
Moreover, in an effort to encourage lenders to originate mortgages 
to creditworthy borrowers with debt-to-income ratios above 43%, the 
CFPB should allow lenders to originate qualified mortgage loans to 
these borrowers if the lenders establish loss reserves to self-insure these 
																																																																																																																																
 199. See CONN. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, OPERATING MANUAL § 5 (2015), http://www.c 
hfa.org/content/CHFA%20Documents/Operating%20Manual%20%20Section%2005%
20Underwriting%20Rev%209-24-15.pdf [http://perma.cc/SK76-GNRL]. 
 200. See VIRGINIA HOUS. DEV. AUTH., ORIGINATION GUIDE § 2.3 (2011), 
http://www.vhda.com/BusinessPartners/Lenders/LoanInfoGuides/Loan%20Information
%20and%20Guidelines/OriginationGuide.pdf [http://perma.cc/XM4G-28HX]. 
 201. See CONN. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, supra note 199. 
 202. See VIRGINIA HOUS. DEV. AUTH., supra note 200. 
 203. See Ctr. for Responsible Lending et al., supra note 4. 
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loans.204 Under this scenario, the government, mortgage originators, and 
consumers all benefit. The government would benefit because the risk of 
default on these loans will not be shouldered by the government, as the 
originator-created loss reserves would be used to cover any losses that 
arise from defaults. 205  The mortgage originators would benefit by 
obtaining the safe harbor from ability-to-repay litigation for qualified 
mortgages.206 These lenders would also benefit by having an expanded 
qualified mortgage market because this proposal would enable them to 
originate qualified mortgages to consumers with debt-to-income ratios 
greater than 43% without approval from a government-sponsored 
enterprise’s automated underwriting engines.207 Furthermore, originators 
would bear no extra risk under this scenario because as long as the loans 
to borrowers with debt-to-income ratios greater than 43% are correctly 
underwritten and based upon the compensating factors, the funds in the 
loss reserves should rarely be lost.208 Less affluent, and consequently 
more minority borrowers, would benefit by now receiving qualified 
mortgages because lenders will seek out the untapped profits that would 
be available from a lending market that previously was not being 
																																																																																																																																
 204. John R. Walter, Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, Loan Loss Reserves, ECON. 
REV., July/Aug. 1991, at 20, http://www.richmondfed.org/~/media/richmondfedorg/pub 
lications/research/economic_review/1991/pdf/er770402.pdf [http://perma.cc/XM5T-6L 
G9] (describing how loan loss reserves have been used to absorb “loan losses both from 
loans the bank can currently identify as bad loans and from some apparently good loans 
that will later prove to be uncollectible.”). 
 205. Moral hazard results in the removal of market discipline by industry actors 
predicated on the expectation that the government will indemnify industry actors 
against the losses. Thus, if originators are self-indemnified, it follows that originators 
should engage in market discipline, removing moral hazard.  Gary H. Stern, President, 
Fed. Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Remarks at the University of Minnesota Economics 
Roundtable: Government Safety Nets and Banking System Stability (Mar. 11, 1998), 
http://www.minneapolisfed.org/news-and-events/presidents-speeches/government-safet 
y-nets-and-banking-system-stability [http://perma.cc/64MJ-LE8S]. 
 206. See 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(e)(1)(i) (2015). 
 207. See id. § 1026.43(e)(2)(vi). 
 208. Christopher Palmer, Why Did So Many Subprime Borrowers Default During 
the Crisis: Loose Credit or Plummeting Prices?, 1, 8 (Nov. 15, 2013) (unpublished 
manuscript), http://web.mit.edu/cjpalmer/www/CPalmer_JMP.pdf [http://perma.cc/L2G 
Q-Y2MB]. Palmer states that “loose underwriting standards increase default rates.” Id. 
at 8. Therefore, it follows that stringent underwriting practices should decrease default 
rates, and thus the need for funds to be withdrawn from the loss reserves to cover the 
defaults. 
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addressed.209 This system would provide wider market access that is 
well underwritten because lenders will be incentivized to undergo 
proper due diligence when underwriting loans in order to not expend its 
funds that are tied up in the loss reserves.210 The government, mortgage 
originators, and consumers would all benefit if the CFPB were to 
implement this proposal. 
C. INCREASE FOCUS ON THE CREATION OF AFFORDABLE HOUSING 
It may also be necessary to redirect some attention from modifying 
the CFPB’s qualified mortgage rule to initiatives that can increase the 
development of affordable housing. Although the qualified mortgage 
rule has its shortcomings, the CFPB chose a 43% debt-to-income ratio 
because “[e]vidence from studies of mortgage loans suggest that 
borrowers with a higher debt-to-income ratio are more likely to run into 
trouble making monthly payments.”211 Furthermore, the CFPB contends 
that the current ratio “protects consumer interests because debt-to-
income ratios are a common and important tool for evaluating 
consumers’ ability to repay their loans over time, and the [43%] 
threshold has been utilized by the . . . FHA . . . for many years as its 
general boundary for defining affordability.”212 
The CFPB has admitted that “[a] consumer with a relatively low 
household income may not be able to afford a 43[%] debt-to-income 
ratio because the remaining income, in absolute dollar terms, is too 
small to enable the consumer to cover his or her living expenses.”213 As 
previously mentioned, the median net worth of Hispanic households and 
Black households in 2013 was $13,700 and $11,000, respectively, 
compared to $141,900 for White households.214 Meanwhile, the median 
																																																																																																																																
 209. See Swanson, supra note 97 (valuing the non-qualified mortgage market at 
approximately fifty billion dollars per year). 
 210. See PHILIP F. BARTHOLOMEW, CONG. BUDGETING OFFICE, REFORMING 
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE 104 (1990) (explaining that a self insurance system 
incentivizes actors to “contain moral hazard and minimize potential loss.”). 
 211. Ask CFPB: What Is a Debt-to-Income Ratio? Why Is the 43% Debt-to-Income 
Ratio Important?, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Feb. 8, 2016) [hereinafter Ask 
CFPB], http://www.consumerfinance.gov/askcfpb/1791/what-debt-income-ratio-why-
43-debt-income-ratio-important.html [http://perma.cc/7D22-7SBF]. 
 212. Ability-to-Repay and Qualified Mortgage Standards Under the Truth in 
Lending Act (Regulation Z), 78 Fed. Reg. 6408 (Jan. 30, 2013). 
 213. Id. 
 214. See Kochhar & Fry, supra note 6. 
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household income of Hispanic households and Black households in 
2014 was $42,491 and $35,398, respectively, in comparison to $60,256 
for White households and $74,297 for Asian households.215 Looking at 
these figures, it becomes apparent that the lower household incomes of 
Black and Hispanic households, when compared to the incomes of 
Asian and White households, may be correlated with the inability of 
more minority borrowers to comply with the 43% debt-to-income 
ratio. 216  Thus, if the 43% threshold protects consumer interests, but 
simultaneously excludes a portion of borrowers from obtaining qualified 
mortgages, the CFPB should work with other federal agencies on 
initiatives that can increase the development of affordable housing.217 
An example of a program the CFPB should strive to emulate is the 
Low-Income Housing Tax Credit, which is “the federal government’s 
primary program for encouraging the investment of private equity in the 
development of affordable rental housing for low-income 
households.”218 Under the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit program, 
individual and corporate investors are allowed to claim tax credits on 
their federal income tax returns for investing “in the development, 
acquisition, and rehabilitation of affordable rental housing.”219 Rather 
than provide tax credits for the rehabilitation or development of rental 
housing, the CFPB should work with other federal agencies to provide 
tax credits for the rehabilitation or development of affordable housing 
for purchase, as lower home prices would afford less affluent borrowers 
the opportunity to receive qualified mortgages.220 
																																																																																																																																
 215. DENAVAS-WALT & PROCTOR, supra note 6, at 5. 
 216. See Witkowski, supra note 91. 
 217. Emily Badger, The Housing Recovery Is Leaving Minorities Behind, WASH. 
POST, (Mar. 17, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/03/17/the 
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 219. Id. at 1-2. 
 220. See Ask CFPB, supra note 211. To calculate a debt-to-income ratio, the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau instructs to add all monthly debt payments and 
divide this number by gross monthly income. Id. It follows that smaller home prices 
will lead to smaller monthly debt payments, which will result in smaller debt-to-income 
ratios for borrowers. 
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CONCLUSION 
Although the CFPB’s qualified mortgage rule was designed with 
good intentions, it is anticipated that the implementation of the rule 
could have dire consequences. It is undisputed that the CFPB’s qualified 
mortgage rule addresses the irresponsible, unfair, deceptive, and abusive 
lending practices that contributed to the subprime mortgage crisis. 
However, in doing so, the inflexible debt-to-income requirements of the 
CFPB’s qualified mortgage rule increase the likelihood that less affluent 
borrowers will be ineligible to meet the requirements for a qualified 
mortgage. As a result, a larger percentage of Black and Hispanic 
borrowers are projected to have to pay higher prices than Asian and 
White borrowers to obtain government-sponsored loans, resulting in 
Black and Hispanic borrowers suffering a disparate impact. Moreover, 
lenders are currently unable to assess their exposure to ability-to-repay 
litigation, as it is unclear whether they will be able to rely upon the 
qualified mortgage status for loans approved by government-sponsored 
enterprises’ automated underwriting engines after the expiration of the 
seven-year exemption or when Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are 
removed from conservatorship. 
Although there is no question that implementing measures to 
address irresponsible lending practices is no small task, the CFPB’s 
qualified mortgage rule and its unyielding 43% debt-to-income ratio 
must be amended so as to not excessively constrain access to qualified 
mortgages for otherwise creditworthy borrowers, and to afford lenders 
the opportunity to modify their loan origination practices so as to not be 
unwillingly exposed to ability-to-repay litigation. Through the 
implementation of the consideration of compensating factors and the 
creation of loss reserves by lenders, lenders will have the opportunity to 
modify their loan origination practices, relieving the constraint on 
creditworthy minority borrowers. 
